The validity of the handicap principle has spawned much debate in spite of the existence of a formal treatment. Simple models constructed to further investigate the issue were able both to prove and to disprove some of its claims. Here I show with the aid of a more general model, which takes into account both assumptions presented in these previous simple models: (1) that the previous results are not in con#ict since they can be obtained as speci"c cases of this general model; (2) that ESS communication need not use costly signals, that is, even under con#ict of interest, the cost of a signal used by a high-quality individual can be zero (or even negative) provided that the cost for low-quality signallers is high enough; (3) that only the cost relative to the bene"ts of the interaction should be higher for worse signallers; and (4) that in a discrete model the di!erential cost is only a necessary but not a su$cient condition for evolutionarily stable reliable communication.
Introduction
There is a long raging debate about the nature of communication in biological systems with two con#icting traditions. According to the "rst school, cheating is widespread among animals and they communicate in order to manipulate each other (Krebs & Dawkins, 1984) . On the contrary, the second school puts the stress upon the honesty of the communication which is maintained by the cost of signals: this is the so-called &&handicap principle'' (Zahavi, 1975 (Zahavi, , 1977 . Although this later view has gained theoretical support (Nur & Hassen, 1985; Pomiankowski, 1987; Grafen, 1990) it is still widely debated either on the ground of #awed assumptions: for instance, the receiver's cost is neglected (Dawkins & Guilford, 1991) , or more generally, because it is not clear how speci"c is the case represented by Grafen's model. Although serious e!orts were made to clarify the situation with simple models, the con#ict remains. Shortly after the publishing of Grafen's result Maynard Smith (1991) constructed the Philip Sidney game to make it easier to follow Grafen's argument. He was able to show that in the case of con#ict of interest, honest signals must be costly, but cost-free signals can be honest if there is no such con#ict between signaller and receiver. On the contrary, in a more recent model, Hurd (1995) has shown that even under con#ict of interest, cost-free communication can be honest provided that the cost, paid by the mutant who does not play the ESS, is large enough. Since both models consider the simplest case of signalling (only two states, two actions and two responses are allowed) it would be interesting to know the underlying di!erences in the assumptions resulting in such con#icting conclusions. In order to investigate the issue, here I propose a more general model by which the previous ones can be explained. It considers both assumptions presented in the previous models; that is, the possible dependence of the signaller's "tness on the signaller state and the possible in#uence of the "tness of each participant on the survival of the other.
In the following section the general model is introduced. In Section 3 three conditions necessary for evolutionarily stable communication under con#ict of interest are described and the cost of signalling is de"ned. The analyses follows in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
The Action+Response Game
The model concerns a minimal signalling game with discrete signals. For the sake of simplicity and continuity, it is couched in terms of the Basic Action}Response game introduced by Hurd (1995) . I will use his notation wherever possible. There are two players: a signaller and a receiver. The signaller can be either in a High or in a Low state, z :
"+H,¸,, which is decided by nature. This initial move is hidden from the receiver; it only observes the behaviour the signaller has chosen, Signal or Not to signal, p :
"+S, N,, and then, based on this observation makes its reply: accepts*turns the signaller Up, or rejects*turns it Down, q : "+;, D,. In the most general case the following assumptions can be made about the signaller's and the receiver's payo!s:
(1) The receiver's "tness (¸P) depends both on the state of the signaller (z) and on the receiver's response (q):¸P
(2) The signaller's "tness (¸Q) is a sum of the value of the receiver's response (<) and the cost of signalling (C):¸Q
where < depends on both the state of the signaller (z) and on the receiver's reply (q), whereas C depends on the state of the signaller (z) and on the behaviour of the signaller (p).
(3) The "tness of each player can be in#uenced by the survival of the other player (r) which can mean, for instance, that they are relatives, or in the same way can help each other (Maynard Smith, 1991) . Based on these assumptions the inclusive "tness of the signaller (E Q ) and the receiver (E P ) can be written as follows:
The next step is to specify the pure strategies available to the players. The signaller can choose its strategy as a function of the original &&move-by-nature'', i.e. its state, whereas the receiver's strategy is a function of the signaller's behaviour. Therefore, four pure strategies are available to both the signaller and the receiver: (D, ;) and (D, D) . However, communication occurs in only four of the strategy pairs, when the signaller provides a variable signal and the receiver responds selectively to it. These four cases are formally identical, which means that the same analysis can be carried out for each pair, thus, it is enough to analyse only one of them [(S, N) (;, D)] (Hurd, 1995) .
Conditions for the Evolutionarily Stable
Signalling under Con6ict of Interest
In order for communication to occur, two conditions must be ful"lled (Hurd, 1995) . The "rst one concerns the receiver and states that it should respond di!erently to the di!erent states of the signaller, accepting a High state one with an Up reply and rejecting a Low state one with Down. That is, the following condition must hold 594 
that is:
The second condition states that the signaller should send di!erent signals as a function of its state. If we assume that it should Signal when it is in a High state and it should Not signal when it is in a Low, then it gives the following condition (signaller's condition for communication*SCC):
The next step is to decide what relation holds between the signaller and the receiver concerning their "nal interest in the outcome of the game. Table 1 summarizes all the possibilities. The Up answer of the receiver denotes whether it is worthwhile for the receiver to turn up the signaller depending on the signaller's state (High, Low). The Up answer for the signaller denotes whether THE VALIDITY OF THE HANDICAP PRINCIPLE it is worthwhile for the signaller to accept the receiver's Up reply (depending on the signaller's state). If both answer Up or both answer Down (given a certain state) then there is no con#ict of interest between them. However, if one answers Up and the other Down then their interest is in con#ict.
(a) Now, in the "rst four cases it is always worthwhile for the receiver to accept the signaller regardless whether it signals or not. Obviously, no communication will evolve, the receiver will always respond with an Up reply.
(b) No communication evolves in the last four cases just for the opposite reason. Since it never pays the receiver to respond, it will always turn the signaller Down.
(c) The second and the third groups of four cases are formally identical hence it is enough to analyse only one of them. Let us continue with the second four. In two of these cases, in the seventh and eighth, there is no communication again for the following reasons, respectively: either their interests are always in con#ict, or it is never worthwhile for the signaller to accept the receiver's Up reply. Finally, two cases remain: the "fth and the sixth. In the sixth case there is no con#ict of interest between the players, and as Maynard Smith has pointed out (1991), cost-free communication can be an ESS and can maintain honest signalling. The most interesting case is of the "fth when there is a con#ict of interest between the two participants. Much of the debate in the literature concerns this situation (Grafen, 1990; Maynard Smith, 1991 , 1994 Hurd, 1995) . In this case it is always bene"cial for the signaller to accept the receiver Up reply whereas it pays for the receiver only to give Up reply if the signaller is in a High state. Since the second part of this statement is included in the RCC, it creates the following constraint for the signaller (con#ict of interest condition*CIC):
where * denotes &&wildcard'' (S or N). Finally, the cost of signalling must be de"ned. This can be di!erent for High-and Low-state signallers:
where C F and C J denote the di!erence in cost between the two possible behaviours (Signal, Not to signal) for High-and Low-state individuals, respectively.
Similarly the receiver's "tness and the value of the receiver's reply can be de"ned depending on the signaller's state (H,¸):
In conclusion it can be seen that evolutionary stable signalling under con#ict of interest gives three conditions to be met (RCC, SCC, and CIC). In the following section the consequences of these conditions are analysed concerning the cost of signalling (C F , C J ), in connection with Grafen's result (1990) . Since it is possible that the value of the receiver's response is the same for all kinds of signallers (< F "< J ), and the cost of the signal may not depend necessarily on the signaller's state (C F "C J ), this gives rise to four possible combinations. If r can equal zero then this doubles the "gure. The receiver's "tness may not depend on the signaller's state as well (= F "= J ), in this case r must be greater than zero otherwise RCC cannot be ful"lled. The case where
and r'0 was analysed by Maynard Smith as the Philip Sidney game, and the case where
There are three regions (1}3) where honest communication is stable (dark grey). In region 1 C F is smaller than zero, thus Grafen's (b) does not hold. In region 2 both Grafen's (b) and (c) hold. In region 3 C F 'C J , thus Grafen's (c) holds only if it is interpreted in terms of relative costs. Note regions 4, 5, 7, and 8 (light grey) where both Grafen's (b) and (c) hold yet dishonesty or no signalling is evolutionarily stable.
C
F OC J and r"0 by Hurd in his Basic Action}Response Game. It is clear that most of the cases have not been analysed yet.
Results
In his paper Grafen has derived three &&main handicap results'' concerning evolutionarily stable signalling: The most general case is when the signaller's "tness depends on the signaller's state and both player's "tness' are in#uenced by the survival of the other. Then RCC, SCC and CIC have the form as it was given in the previous section.
Rearranging them gives the following inequalities: Figure 1 shows the resulting three regions (1}3) where honesty is evolutionarily stable as a THE VALIDITY OF THE HANDICAP PRINCIPLE 597 function of C F and C J . In the "rst region C F is smaller than zero, thus Grafen's (b) does not hold. In the second region both Grafen's (b) and (c) hold. Finally, in the third region C F 'C J , thus Grafen's (c) holds only if it is interpreted in terms of relative costs. From the "gure and the inequalities we can see:
(1) that Grafen's (b) is not necessarily ful"lled, since the only constraint upon C F is < F #r= F 'C F , that is, C F can be negative; (2) that Grafen's (c) is also not a necessary condition for ESS communication if it is interpreted in terms of simple costs since < F #r= F can be greater than < J #r= J , thus the condition C F 'C J can be met which contradicts Grafen's (c). However, in terms of relative costs, when the cost of the signal divided by the overall bene"t,
, condition (c) must hold since for a high-quality signaller the numerator is always greater than the denominator whereas for a low-quality signaller just the opposite is the case (IS). Thus the relative cost is always greater for a low quality individual than for a high one. However, as can be seen from Fig. 1 , even if Grafen's (c) is interpreted in terms of relative costs, it is still not a su$cient condition for ESS signalling. There are four regions (4, 5, 7, and 8) where the notion of the di!erential cost holds but honest communication is not evolutionarily stable. In the fourth and "fth case this is so because it is not worth even for high-quality individuals to signal, and in the seventh and eighth case for the opposite reason, that is, it is worth even for low-quality individuals to signal.
The same analysis can be carried out if we assume that < F "< J , or C F "C J , or r"0 or any combination of these. The assumption = F "= J has no qualitative e!ect on the results except that it implies r'0 because if both = F "= J and r"0 then RCC cannot be met hence no communication can evolve. For instance, let us analyse the case: < F "< J , C F OC J , r'0. This gives the following inequalities for RCC, SCC and CIC:
= (H, ;)#r(<(;)!C(H, S)) '=(H, D)#r(<(D)!C(H, S)),
(RCCa)
=(¸, ;)#r(<(;)!C(¸, S)) (=(¸, D)#r(<(D)!C(¸, S)), (RCCb)
After rearrangement we have
The inequalities resulting from RCC, SCC and CIC for all the eight possible cases are summarized in Table 2 (in each case it is assumed that = F O= J ). Note, that in the last case where the bene"t (<) and the cost (C) are the same for highand low-quality individuals and r"0, evolutionarily stable signalling is not possible. The table also shows in each case the consequences on Grafen's results. As can be seen, Grafen's (b) holds only if we do not allow the cost of the signal to vary with the signaller's state, that is, we assume that the cost is the same for all individuals (C F "C J ). This follows from the fact that both the high-and the low-quality signaller's expected "tness is always greater than zero (see Table 2,   598 TABLE 2  IR, IS and IC for the eight possible combinations second column: IC); and that the cost for highquality signallers should be smaller than this (creating an upper bound for C F but not a lower one) but the cost for low-quality signallers should be greater than this (creating a lower bound for C J but not a upper one) (see the conditions for IS, Table 2 , "rst column). However, the lower and the upper bound combine together if we do not allow the cost to vary independently with the signaller's state. Thus, in this case the cost should be always greater than zero (see Fig. 2 for an example). Grafen's (c) holds in each case provided it is interpreted in terms of relative costs. However, if it is interpreted in terms of simple costs then it holds only in the sixth case because in this case the expected "tness' are the same for high-and low-quality signallers but the cost can vary.
and their consequences on Grafen1s main handicap results
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Discussion
The present model shows that in a simple discrete communication game two types of outcomes are possible, depending on whether the signaller's "tness and the cost of the signal depend on the signaller's state and on the assumption of inclusive "tness (or on other kinds of in#uence between the signaller's and the receiver's "tness). On the one hand, if the cost of the signal can vary with the signaller's state (C F OC J ) Grafen's (b) is not a necessary condition for evolutionarily stable communication, that is, signals need not be costly. On the other hand (C F "C J ), Grafen's (b) holds only because the cost of the signal is the same for all kind of individuals. In all cases Grafen's (c) holds if it is interpreted in terms of relative costs, i.e. the signal should be more costly for low-quality individuals not in itself but in relation to the whole bene"t of the interaction. However, if it is interpreted in terms of simple costs then there is only one case in which Grafen's (c) holds, the sixth, and by chance exactly this case was analysed by Hurd. This makes clear why he has concluded, even though he was thinking in terms of simple costs, that: &&Grafen's (c) follows directly from the de"nition of communication ''. Yaschi (1995) has also arrived at a similar conclusion, although he analysed a di!erent case. He assumed that both the value of the signaller's response and the cost of the signal can vary with the signaller's state (C F OC J , < F O< J , r"0). As we know, in this case Grafen's (c) holds only in terms of relative costs. Yaschi, however, made an additional assumption, that the value of the receiver's response should be always greater for low-quality individuals than that for high-quality ones (< F (< J ). This explains why he could assert that his results are consistent with Grafen's result even in terms of simple cost. However, even if Grafen's (c) is interpreted in terms of relative costs in a discrete communication game it is not enough in itself to guarantee stable and reliable communication (see Fig. 1 ). The notion of the di!erential cost is a necessary but not a su$cient condition.
The present model shows that the stability conditions for honest and evolutionarily stable communication are as follows: (a) it is bene"cial to a high-quality individual to use the signal (i.e.
, and (b) a low-quality individual cannot expect an overall bene"t from using it (i.e. < J #r= J (C J ). Note, that the cost of the signal for a low-quality individual (C J ) should exceed the di!erence between the bene"ts of the possible alternative outcomes [<(¸, ;)# r=(¸, ;)![ <(¸, D)!r= (¸, D)"< J #r= J , see eqn (SCCb)] and not the bene"t resulting from the use of the signal (<(¸, ;)#r= (¸, ;)). That is, both the signal cost and the possible bene"ts should be treated as relative quantities (for a more detailed discussion of signal cost, see Bergstrom & Lachmann, 1998) . In this sense these conditions are identical to Zahavi's (1993) formulation in which he says that: &&. . . the investment in a signal cannot be greater than the potential gain from using it properly. A signal is reliable when the investment required for its use is greater than the potential gain a cheater would make from using it improperly. The investment should be acceptable to an honest signaller and prohibitive to a cheater''.
The model shows that Grafen's results, which were derived from a continuous model cannot be &&translated'' directly to a discrete case. That is, the handicap principle may have to be formulated di!erently in case of discrete and in case of continuous models (for a detailed discussion of the continuous case, see Getty, 1998a, b) . Only in one dimension (regarding C, that is, when C F "C J ) is it true that Grafen's (b) and (c) are necessary and su$cient conditions for ESS signalling. In two dimensions (i.e. C F OC J ), although there is an overlap between the regions where Grafen's conditions are valid and the regions where honest communication is evolutionarily stable, the overlap is far from complete. To present the di!erence more clearly it is useful to compare them graphically. Figure 3 depicts (a) Grafen's de"nition in terms of simple costs, (b) Grafen's de"nition in terms of relative costs, and (c) the stability conditions for honest and evolutionarily stable communication. Shaded areas represent the honest and evolutionarily stable regions according to the appropriate de"nition. Note, that neither Grafen's de"nition is a subset of the stability conditions nor the stability conditions are subsets of Grafen's de"nition. Moreover, Fig. 1 reveals that in the regions 4, 5, 7 and 8 both Grafen's (b) and (c) relative costs), yet in the regions 4 and 5 signalling will not evolve because it is not worth to signal even for high-quality signallers, and in the regions 7 and 8 deception is evolutionarily stable because it is worth to signal even for a low-quality signaller [in face of Grafen's (b) and (c)!]. Such regions can be found wherever C F di!ers from C J , that is, in four cases out of the possible eight. On the other hand, in region 1 Grafen's (b) does not hold, yet honest communication is evolutionarily stable. Finally, it should be emphasized that the fact that Grafen's de"nition cannot be &&trans-lated'' directly to discrete models does not question its validity in the continuous case. Moreover, the present model is fully in line with the recent result of Getty (1998a, b) which says that in an evolutionarily stable signalling system high-quality individuals should convert advertisement into "tness more e$ciently than low-quality individuals do.
The model also highlights the di!erence in the assumptions of two previous models concerning simple communication games (Maynard Smith, 1991; Hurd, 1995) . The crucial one is that while in Hurd's model the cost of a signal can vary with the signaller's state, in Maynard Smith's model it cannot. For this reason Maynard Smith's choice may not be the best one, since his model is to emphasize that signalling must be costly but if his condition is rejected it turns out to be otherwise. However, Maynard Smith points out a very important conclusion, that cost-free communication can be stable if there is no con#ict of interest between the participants.
